Chapter One
A DEEPLY RELIGIOUS NON-BELIEVER I don't try to imagine a personal God;
it suffices to stand in awe at the structure of the world, insofar as it
allows our inadequate senses to appreciate it. —Albert Einstein
DESERVED RESPECT
The boy lay prone in the grass, his chin resting on his hands. He
suddenly found himself overwhelmed by a heightened awareness of the
tangled stems and roots, a forest in microcosm, a transfigured world of
ants and beetles and even – though he wouldn't have known the details
at the time – of soil bacteria by the billions, silently and invisibly
shoring up the economy of the micro-world. Suddenly the micro-forest of
the turf seemed to swell and become one with the universe, and with the
rapt mind of the boy contemplating it. He interpreted the experience in
religious terms and it led him eventually to the priesthood. He was
ordained an Anglican priest and became a chaplain at my school, a
teacher of whom I was fond. It is thanks to decent liberal clergymen
like him that nobody could ever claim that I had religion forced down my
throat.* In another time and place, that boy could have been me under
the stars, dazzled by Orion, Cassiopeia and Ursa Major, tearful with the
unheard music of the Milky Way, heady with the night scents of
frangipani and trumpet flowers in an African garden. Why the same
emotion should have led my chaplain in one direction and me in the other
is not an easy question to answer. A quasi-mystical response to nature
and the universe is common among scientists and rationalists. It has no
connection with supernatural belief. In his boyhood at least, my
chaplain was presumably not aware (nor was I) of the closing lines of
The Origin of Species – the famous 'entangled bank' passage, 'with
birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and
with worms crawling through the damp earth'. Had he been, he would
certainly have identified with it and, instead of the priesthood, might
have been led to Darwin's view that all was 'produced by laws acting
around us':
Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted
object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the
higher animals, directly follows. There is grandeur in this view of
life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed into a
few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on
according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning
endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are
being, evolved.
Carl Sagan, in Pale Blue Dot, wrote:
How is it that hardly any major religion has looked at science and
concluded, 'This is better than we thought! The Universe is much bigger
than our prophets said, grander, more subtle, more elegant'? Instead
they say, 'No, no, no! My god is a little god, and I want him to stay
that way.' A religion, old or new, that stressed the magnificence of the
Universe as revealed by modern science might be able to draw forth
reserves of reverence and awe hardly tapped by the conventional faiths.
All Sagan's books touch the nerve-endings of transcendent wonder that
religion monopolized in past centuries. My own books have the same
aspiration. Consequently I hear myself often described as a deeply
religious man. An American student wrote to me that she had asked her
professor whether he had a view about me. 'Sure,' he replied. 'He's
positive science is incompatible with religion, but he waxes ecstatic
about nature and the universe. To me, that is religion!' But is
'religion' the right word? I don't think so. The Nobel Prize-winning
physicist (and atheist) Steven Weinberg made the point as well as
anybody, in Dreams of a Final Theory:
Some people have views of God that are so broad and flexible that it is
inevitable that they will find God wherever they look for him. One hears
it said that 'God is the ultimate' or 'God is our better nature' or 'God
is the universe.' Of course, like any other word, the word 'God' can be
given any meaning we like. If you want to say that 'God is energy,' then
you can find God in a lump of coal.
Weinberg is surely right that, if the word God is not to become
completely useless, it should be used in the way people have generally
understood it: to denote a supernatural creator that is 'appropriate for
us to worship'. Much unfortunate confusion is caused by failure to
distinguish what can be called Einsteinian religion from supernatural
religion. Einstein sometimes invoked the name of God (and he is not the
only atheistic scientist to do so), inviting misunderstanding by
supernaturalists eager to misunderstand and claim so illustrious a
thinker as their own. The dramatic (or was it mischievous?) ending of
Stephen Hawking's A Brief History of Time, 'For then we should know the
mind of God', is notoriously misconstrued. It has led people to believe,
mistakenly of course, that Hawking is a religious man. The cell
biologist Ursula Goodenough, in The Sacred Depths of Nature, sounds more
religious than Hawking or Einstein. She loves churches, mosques and
temples, and numerous passages in her book fairly beg to be taken out of
context and used as ammunition for supernatural religion. She goes so
far as to call herself a 'Religious Naturalist'. Yet a careful reading
of her book shows that she is really as staunch an atheist as I am.
'Naturalist' is an ambiguous word. For me it conjures my childhood hero,
Hugh Lofting's Doctor Dolittle (who, by the way, had more than a touch
of the 'philosopher' naturalist of HMS Beagle about him). In the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, naturalist meant what it still
means for most of us today: a student of the natural world. Naturalists
in this sense, from Gilbert White on, have often been clergymen. Darwin
himself was destined for the Church as a young man, hoping that the
leisurely life of a country parson would enable him to pursue his
passion for beetles. But philosophers use 'naturalist' in a very
different sense, as the opposite of supernaturalist. Julian Baggini
explains in Atheism: A Very Short Introduction the meaning of an
atheist's commitment to naturalism: 'What most atheists do believe is
that although there is only one kind of stuff in the universe and it is
physical, out of this stuff come minds, beauty, emotions, moral values
– in short the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness to human
life.' Human thoughts and emotions emerge from exceedingly complex
interconnections of physical entities within the brain. An atheist in
this sense of philosophical naturalist is somebody who believes there is
nothing beyond the natural, physical world, no supernatural creative
intelligence lurking behind the observable universe, no soul that
outlasts the body and no miracles – except in the sense of natural
phenomena that we don't yet understand. If there is something that
appears to lie beyond the natural world as it is now imperfectly
understood, we hope eventually to understand it and embrace it within
the natural. As ever when we unweave a rainbow, it will not become less
wonderful. Great scientists of our time who sound religious usually turn
out not to be so when you examine their beliefs more deeply. This is
certainly true of Einstein and Hawking. The present Astronomer Royal and
President of the Royal Society, Martin Rees, told me that he goes to
church as an 'unbelieving Anglican . . . out of loyalty to the tribe'.
He has no theistic beliefs, but shares the poetic naturalism that the
cosmos provokes in the other scientists I have mentioned. In the course
of a recently televised conversation, I challenged my friend the
obstetrician Robert Winston, a respected pillar of British Jewry, to
admit that his Judaism was of exactly this character and that he didn't
really believe in anything supernatural. He came close to admitting it
but shied at the last fence (to be fair, he was supposed to be
interviewing me, not the other way around).3 When I pressed him, he said
he found that Judaism provided a good discipline to help him structure
his life and lead a good one. Perhaps it does; but that, of course, has
not the smallest bearing on the truth value of any of its supernatural
claims. There are many intellectual atheists who proudly call themselves
Jews and observe Jewish rites, perhaps out of loyalty to an ancient
tradition or to murdered relatives, but also because of a confused and
confusing willingness to label as 'religion' the pantheistic reverence
which many of us share with its most distinguished exponent, Albert
Einstein. They may not believe but, to borrow Dan Dennett's phrase, they
'believe in belief'.4 One of Einstein's most eagerly quoted remarks is
'Science without religion is lame, religion without science is blind.'
But Einstein also said,
It was, of course, a lie what you read about my religious convictions, a
lie which is being systematically repeated. I do not believe in a
personal God and I have never denied this but have expressed it clearly.
If something is in me which can be called religious then it is the
unbounded admiration for the structure of the world so far as our
science can reveal it.
Does it seem that Einstein contradicted himself? That his words can be
cherry-picked for quotes to support both sides of an argument? No. By
'religion' Einstein meant something entirely different from what is
conventionally meant. As I continue to clarify the distinction between
supernatural religion on the one hand and Einsteinian religion on the
other, bear in mind that I am calling only supernatural gods delusional.
Here are some more quotations from Einstein, to give a flavour of
Einsteinian religion.
I am a deeply religious nonbeliever. This is a somewhat new kind of
religion.
I have never imputed to Nature a purpose or a goal, or anything that
could be understood as anthropomorphic. What I see in Nature is a
magnificent structure that we can comprehend only very imperfectly, and
that must fill a thinking person with a feeling of humility. This is a
genuinely religious feeling that has nothing to do with mysticism.
The idea of a personal God is quite alien to me and seems even naive.
In greater numbers since his death, religious apologists understandably
try to claim Einstein as one of their own. Some of his religious
contemporaries saw him very differently. In 1940 Einstein wrote a famous
paper justifying his statement 'I do not believe in a personal God.'
This and similar statements provoked a storm of letters from the
religiously orthodox, many of them alluding to Einstein's Jewish
origins. The extracts that follow are taken from Max Jammer's book
Einstein and Religion (which is also my main source of quotations from
Einstein himself on religious matters). The Roman Catholic Bishop of
Kansas City said: 'It is sad to see a man, who comes from the race of
the Old Testament and its teaching, deny the great tradition of that
race.' Other Catholic clergymen chimed in: 'There is no other God but a
personal God . . . Einstein does not know what he is talking about. He
is all wrong. Some men think that because they have achieved a high
degree of learning in some field, they are qualified to express opinions
in all.' The notion that religion is a proper field, in which one might
claim expertise, is one that should not go unquestioned. That clergyman
presumably would not have deferred to the expertise of a claimed
'fairyologist' on the exact shape and colour of fairy wings. Both he and
the bishop thought that Einstein, being theologically untrained, had
misunderstood the nature of God. On the contrary, Einstein understood
very well exactly what he was denying. An American Roman Catholic
lawyer, working on behalf of an ecumenical coalition, wrote to Einstein:
We deeply regret that you made your statement . . . in which you
ridicule the idea of a personal God. In the past ten years nothing has
been so calculated to make people think that Hitler had some reason to
expel the Jews from Germany as your statement. Conceding your right to
free speech, I still say that your statement constitutes you as one of
the greatest sources of discord in America.
A New York rabbi said: 'Einstein is unquestionably a great scientist,
but his religious views are diametrically opposed to Judaism.' 'But'?
'But'? Why not 'and'? The president of a historical society in New
Jersey wrote a letter that so damningly exposes the weakness of the
religious mind, it is worth reading twice:
We respect your learning, Dr Einstein; but there is one thing you do not
seem to have learned: that God is a spirit and cannot be found through
the telescope or microscope, no more than human thought or emotion can
be found by analyzing the brain. As everyone knows, religion is based on
Faith, not knowledge. Every thinking person, perhaps, is assailed at
times with religious doubt. My own faith has wavered many a time. But I
never told anyone of my spiritual aberrations for two reasons: (1) I
feared that I might, by mere suggestion, disturb and damage the life and
hopes of some fellow being; (2) because I agree with the writer who
said, 'There is a mean streak in anyone who will destroy another's
faith.' . . . I hope, Dr Einstein, that you were misquoted and that you
will yet say something more pleasing to the vast number of the American
people who delight to do you honor.
What a devastatingly revealing letter! Every sentence drips with
intellectual and moral cowardice. Less abject but more shocking was the
letter from the Founder of the Calvary Tabernacle Association in
Oklahoma:
Professor Einstein, I believe that every Christian in America will
answer you, 'We will not give up our belief in our God and his son Jesus
Christ, but we invite you, if you do not believe in the God of the
people of this nation, to go back where you came from.' I have done
everything in my power to be a blessing to Israel, and then you come
along and with one statement from your blasphemous tongue, do more to
hurt the cause of your people than all the efforts of the Christians who
love Israel can do to stamp out anti- Semitism in our land. Professor
Einstein, every Christian in America will immediately reply to you,
'Take your crazy, fallacious theory of evolution and go back to Germany
where you came from, or stop trying to break down the faith of a people
who gave you a welcome when you were forced to flee your native land.'
The one thing all his theistic critics got right was that Einstein was
not one of them. He was repeatedly indignant at the suggestion that he
was a theist. So, was he a deist, like Voltaire and Diderot? Or a
pantheist, like Spinoza, whose philosophy he admired: 'I believe in
Spinoza's God who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists,
not in a God who concerns himself with fates and actions of human
beings'? Let's remind ourselves of the terminology. A theist believes in
a supernatural intelligence who, in addition to his main work of
creating the universe in the first place, is still around to oversee and
influence the subsequent fate of his initial creation. In many theistic
belief systems, the deity is intimately involved in human affairs. He
answers prayers; forgives or punishes sins; intervenes in the world by
performing miracles; frets about good and bad deeds, and knows when we
do them (or even think of doing them). A deist, too, believes in a
supernatural intelligence, but one whose activities were confined to
setting up the laws that govern the universe in the first place. The
deist God never intervenes thereafter, and certainly has no specific
interest in human affairs. Pantheists don't believe in a supernatural
God at all, but use the word God as a nonsupernatural synonym for
Nature, or for the Universe, or for the lawfulness that governs its
workings. Deists differ from theists in that their God does not answer
prayers, is not interested in sins or confessions, does not read our
thoughts and does not intervene with capricious miracles. Deists differ
from pantheists in that the deist God is some kind of cosmic
intelligence, rather than the pantheist's metaphoric or poetic synonym
for the laws of the universe. Pantheism is sexed-up atheism. Deism is
watered-down theism. There is every reason to think that famous
Einsteinisms like 'God is subtle but he is not malicious' or 'He does
not play dice' or 'Did God have a choice in creating the Universe?' are
pantheistic, not deistic, and certainly not theistic. 'God does not play
dice' should be translated as 'Randomness does not lie at the heart of
all things.' 'Did God have a choice in creating the Universe?' means
'Could the universe have begun in any other way?' Einstein was using
'God' in a purely metaphorical, poetic sense. So is Stephen Hawking, and
so are most of those physicists who occasionally slip into the language
of religious metaphor. Paul Davies's The Mind of God seems to hover
somewhere between Einsteinian pantheism and an obscure form of deism –
for which he was rewarded with the Templeton Prize (a very large sum of
money given annually by the Templeton Foundation, usually to a scientist
who is prepared to say something nice about religion). Let me sum up
Einsteinian religion in one more quotation from Einstein himself: 'To
sense that behind anything that can be experienced there is a something
that our mind cannot grasp and whose beauty and sublimity reaches us
only indirectly and as a feeble reflection, this is religiousness. In
this sense I am religious.' In this sense I too am religious, with the
reservation that 'cannot grasp' does not have to mean 'forever
ungraspable'. But I prefer not to call myself religious because it is
misleading. It is destructively misleading because, for the vast
majority of people, 'religion' implies 'supernatural'. Carl Sagan put it
well: '. . . if by "God" one means the set of physical laws that govern
the universe, then clearly there is such a God. This God is emotionally
unsatisfying . . . it does not make much sense to pray to the law of
gravity.' Amusingly, Sagan's last point was foreshadowed by the Reverend
Dr Fulton J. Sheen, a professor at the Catholic University of America,
as part of a fierce attack upon Einstein's 1940 disavowal of a personal
God. Sheen sarcastically asked whether anyone would be prepared to lay
down his life for the Milky Way. He seemed to think he was making a
point against Einstein, rather than for him, for he added: 'There is
only one fault with his cosmical religion: he put an extra letter in the
word – the letter "s".' There is nothing comical about Einstein's
beliefs. Nevertheless, I wish that physicists would refrain from using
the word God in their special metaphorical sense. The metaphorical or
pantheistic God of the physicists is light years away from the
interventionist, miracle-wreaking, thought-reading, sin-punishing,
prayer- answering God of the Bible, of priests, mullahs and rabbis, and
of ordinary language. Deliberately to confuse the two is, in my opinion,
an act of intellectual high treason.
* Our sport during lessons was to sidetrack him away from scripture and
towards stirring tales of Fighter Command and the Few. He had done war
service in the RAF and it was with familiarity, and something of the
affection that I still retain for the Church of England (at least by
comparison with the competition), that I later read John Betjeman's
poem: Our padre is an old sky pilot, Severely now they've clipped his
wings, But still the flagstaff in the Rect'ry garden Points to Higher
Things . . .
UNDESERVED RESPECT
My title, The God Delusion, does not refer to the God of Einstein and
the other enlightened scientists of the previous section. That is why I
needed to get Einsteinian religion out of the way to begin with: it has
a proven capacity to confuse. In the rest of this book I am talking only
about supernatural gods, of which the most familiar to the majority of
my readers will be Yahweh, the God of the Old Testament. I shall come to
him in a moment. But before leaving this preliminary chapter I need to
deal with one more matter that would otherwise bedevil the whole book.
This time it is a matter of etiquette. It is possible that religious
readers will be offended by what I have to say, and will find in these
pages insufficient respect for their own particular beliefs (if not the
beliefs that others treasure). It would be a shame if such offence
prevented them from reading on, so I want to sort it out here, at the
outset. A widespread assumption, which nearly everybody in our society
accepts – the non-religious included – is that religious faith is
especially vulnerable to offence and should be protected by an
abnormally thick wall of respect, in a different class from the respect
that any human being should pay to any other. Douglas Adams put it so
well, in an impromptu speech made in Cambridge shortly before his
death,5 that I never tire of sharing his words:
Religion . . . has certain ideas at the heart of it which we call sacred
or holy or whatever. What it means is, 'Here is an idea or a notion that
you're not allowed to say anything bad about; you're just not. Why not?
– because you're not!' If somebody votes for a party that you don't
agree with, you're free to argue about it as much as you like; everybody
will have an argument but nobody feels aggrieved by it. If somebody
thinks taxes should go up or down you are free to have an argument about
it. But on the other hand if somebody says 'I mustn't move a light
switch on a Saturday', you say, 'I respect that'. Why should it be that
it's perfectly legitimate to support the Labour party or the
Conservative party, Republicans or Democrats, this model of economics
versus that, Macintosh instead of Windows – but to have an opinion
about how the Universe began, about who created the Universe . . . no,
that's holy? . . . We are used to not challenging religious ideas but
it's very interesting how much of a furore Richard creates when he does
it! Everybody gets absolutely frantic about it because you're not
allowed to say these things. Yet when you look at it rationally there is
no reason why those ideas shouldn't be as open to debate as any other,
except that we have agreed somehow between us that they shouldn't be.
Here's a particular example of our society's overweening respect for
religion, one that really matters. By far the easiest grounds for
gaining conscientious objector status in wartime are religious. You can
be a brilliant moral philosopher with a prizewinning doctoral thesis
expounding the evils of war, and still be given a hard time by a draft
board evaluating your claim to be a conscientious objector. Yet if you
can say that one or both of your parents is a Quaker you sail through
like a breeze, no matter how inarticulate and illiterate you may be on
the theory of pacifism or, indeed, Quakerism itself. At the opposite end
of the spectrum from pacifism, we have a pusillanimous reluctance to use
religious names for warring factions. In Northern Ireland, Catholics and
Protestants are euphemized to 'Nationalists' and 'Loyalists'
respectively. The very word 'religions' is bowdlerized to 'communities',
as in 'intercommunity warfare'. Iraq, as a consequence of the
Anglo-American invasion of 2003, degenerated into sectarian civil war
between Sunni and Shia Muslims. Clearly a religious conflict – yet in
the Independent of 20 May 2006 the front-page headline and first leading
article both described it as 'ethnic cleansing'. 'Ethnic' in this
context is yet another euphemism. What we are seeing in Iraq is
religious cleansing. The original usage of 'ethnic cleansing' in the
former Yugoslavia is also arguably a euphemism for religious cleansing,
involving Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Croats and Muslim Bosnians.6 I have
previously drawn attention to the privileging of religion in public
discussions of ethics in the media and in government.7 Whenever a
controversy arises over sexual or reproductive morals, you can bet that
religious leaders from several different faith groups will be
prominently represented on influential committees, or on panel
discussions on radio or television. I'm not suggesting that we should go
out of our way to censor the views of these people. But why does our
society beat a path to their door, as though they had some expertise
comparable to that of, say, a moral philosopher, a family lawyer or a
doctor? Here's another weird example of the privileging of religion. On
21 February 2006 the United States Supreme Court ruled that a church in
New Mexico should be exempt from the law, which everybody else has to
obey, against the taking of hallucinogenic drugs.8 Faithful members of
the Centro Espirita Beneficiente Uniao do Vegetal believe that they can
understand God only by drinking hoasca tea, which contains the illegal
hallucinogenic drug dimethyltryptamine. Note that it is sufficient that
they believe that the drug enhances their understanding. They do not
have to produce evidence. Conversely, there is plenty of evidence that
cannabis eases the nausea and discomfort of cancer sufferers undergoing
chemotherapy. Yet the Supreme Court ruled, in 2005, that all patients
who use cannabis for medicinal purposes are vulnerable to federal
prosecution (even in the minority of states where such specialist use is
legalized). Religion, as ever, is the trump card. Imagine members of an
art appreciation society pleading in court that they 'believe' they need
a hallucinogenic drug in order to enhance their understanding of
Impressionist or Surrealist paintings. Yet, when a church claims an
equivalent need, it is backed by the highest court in the land. Such is
the power of religion as a talisman. Seventeen years ago, I was one of
thirty-six writers and artists commissioned by the magazine New
Statesman to write in support of the distinguished author Salman
Rushdie,9 then under sentence of death for writing a novel. Incensed by
the 'sympathy' for Muslim 'hurt' and 'offence' expressed by Christian
leaders and even some secular opinion-formers, I drew the following
parallel:
If the advocates of apartheid had their wits about them they would claim
– for all I know truthfully – that allowing mixed races is against
their religion. A good part of the opposition would respectfully tiptoe
away. And it is no use claiming that this is an unfair parallel because
apartheid has no rational justification. The whole point of religious
faith, its strength and chief glory, is that it does not depend on
rational justification. The rest of us are expected to defend our
prejudices. But ask a religious person to justify their faith and you
infringe 'religious liberty'.
Little did I know that something pretty similar would come to pass in
the twenty-first century. The Los Angeles Times (10 April 2006) reported
that numerous Christian groups on campuses around the United States were
suing their universities for enforcing anti-discrimination rules,
including prohibitions against harassing or abusing homosexuals. As a
typical example, in 2004 James Nixon, a twelve-year-old boy in Ohio, won
the right in court to wear a T-shirt to school bearing the words
'Homosexuality is a sin, Islam is a lie, abortion is murder. Some issues
are just black and white!'10 The school told him not to wear the T-shirt
– and the boy's parents sued the school. The parents might have had a
conscionable case if they had based it on the First Amendment's
guarantee of freedom of speech. But they didn't: indeed, they couldn't,
because free speech is deemed not to include 'hate speech'. But hate
only has to prove it is religious, and it no longer counts as hate. So,
instead of freedom of speech, the Nixons' lawyers appealed to the
constitutional right to freedom of religion. Their victorious lawsuit
was supported by the Alliance Defense Fund of Arizona, whose business it
is to 'press the legal battle for religious freedom'. The Reverend Rick
Scarborough, supporting the wave of similar Christian lawsuits brought
to establish religion as a legal justification for discrimination
against homosexuals and other groups, has named it the civil rights
struggle of the twenty-first century: 'Christians are going to have to
take a stand for the right to be Christian.'11 Once again, if such
people took their stand on the right to free speech, one might
reluctantly sympathize. But that isn't what it is about. The legal case
in favour of discrimination against homosexuals is being mounted as a
counter-suit against alleged religious discrimination! And the law seems
to respect this. You can't get away with saying, 'If you try to stop me
from insulting homosexuals it violates my freedom of prejudice.' But you
can get away with saying, 'It violates my freedom of religion.' What,
when you think about it, is the difference? Yet again, religion trumps
all. I'll end the chapter with a particular case study, which tellingly
illuminates society's exaggerated respect for religion, over and above
ordinary human respect. The case flared up in February 2006 – a
ludicrous episode, which veered wildly between the extremes of comedy
and tragedy. The previous September, the Danish newspaper
Jyllands-Posten published twelve cartoons depicting the prophet
Muhammad. Over the next three months, indignation was carefully and
systematically nurtured throughout the Islamic world by a small group of
Muslims living in Denmark, led by two imams who had been granted
sanctuary there.12 In late 2005 these malevolent exiles travelled from
Denmark to Egypt bearing a dossier, which was copied and circulated from
there to the whole Islamic world, including, importantly, Indonesia. The
dossier contained falsehoods about alleged maltreatment of Muslims in
Denmark, and the tendentious lie that Jyllands-Posten was a
government-run newspaper. It also contained the twelve cartoons which,
crucially, the imams had supplemented with three additional images whose
origin was mysterious but which certainly had no connection with
Denmark. Unlike the original twelve, these three add-ons were genuinely
offensive – or would have been if they had, as the zealous
propagandists alleged, depicted Muhammad. A particularly damaging one of
these three was not a cartoon at all but a faxed photograph of a bearded
man wearing a fake pig's snout held on with elastic. It has subsequently
turned out that this was an Associated Press photograph of a Frenchman
entered for a pig-squealing contest at a country fair in France.13 The
photograph had no connection whatsoever with the prophet Muhammad, no
connection with Islam, and no connection with Denmark. But the Muslim
activists, on their mischief-stirring hike to Cairo, implied all three
connections . . . with predictable results. The carefully cultivated
'hurt' and 'offence' was brought to an explosive head five months after
the twelve cartoons were originally published. Demonstrators in Pakistan
and Indonesia burned Danish flags (where did they get them from?) and
hysterical demands were made for the Danish government to apologize.
(Apologize for what? They didn't draw the cartoons, or publish them.
Danes just live in a country with a free press, something that people in
many Islamic countries might have a hard time understanding.) Newspapers
in Norway, Germany, France and even the United States (but,
conspicuously, not Britain) reprinted the cartoons in gestures of
solidarity with Jyllands-Posten, which added fuel to the flames.
Embassies and consulates were trashed, Danish goods were boycotted,
Danish citizens and, indeed, Westerners generally, were physically
threatened; Christian churches in Pakistan, with no Danish or European
connections at all, were burned. Nine people were killed when Libyan
rioters attacked and burned the Italian consulate in Benghazi. As
Germaine Greer wrote, what these people really love and do best is
pandemonium.14 A bounty of $1 million was placed on the head of 'the
Danish cartoonist' by a Pakistani imam – who was apparently unaware
that there were twelve different Danish cartoonists, and almost
certainly unaware that the three most offensive pictures had never
appeared in Denmark at all (and, by the way, where was that million
going to come from?). In Nigeria, Muslim protesters against the Danish
cartoons burned down several Christian churches, and used machetes to
attack and kill (black Nigerian) Christians in the streets. One
Christian was put inside a rubber tyre, doused with petrol and set
alight. Demonstrators were photographed in Britain bearing banners
saying 'Slay those who insult Islam', 'Butcher those who mock Islam',
'Europe you will pay: Demolition is on its way' and, apparently without
irony, 'Behead those who say Islam is a violent religion'. In the
aftermath of all this, the journalist Andrew Mueller interviewed
Britain's leading 'moderate' Muslim, Sir Iqbal Sacranie.15 Moderate he
may be by today's Islamic standards, but in Andrew Mueller's account he
still stands by the remark he made when Salman Rushdie was condemned to
death for writing a novel: 'Death is perhaps too easy for him' – a
remark that sets him in ignominious contrast to his courageous
predecessor as Britain's most influential Muslim, the late Dr Zaki
Badawi, who offered Salman Rushdie sanctuary in his own home. Sacranie
told Mueller how concerned he was about the Danish cartoons. Mueller was
concerned too, but for a different reason: 'I am concerned that the
ridiculous, disproportionate reaction to some unfunny sketches in an
obscure Scandinavian newspaper may confirm that . . . Islam and the west
are fundamentally irreconcilable.' Sacranie, on the other hand, praised
British newspapers for not reprinting the cartoons, to which Mueller
voiced the suspicion of most of the nation that 'the restraint of
British newspapers derived less from sensitivity to Muslim discontent
than it did from a desire not to have their windows broken'. Sacranie
explained that 'The person of the Prophet, peace be upon him, is revered
so profoundly in the Muslim world, with a love and affection that cannot
be explained in words. It goes beyond your parents, your loved ones,
your children. That is part of the faith. There is also an Islamic
teaching that one does not depict the Prophet.' This rather assumes, as
Mueller observed,
that the values of Islam trump anyone else's – which is what any
follower of Islam does assume, just as any follower of any religion
believes that theirs is the sole way, truth and light. If people wish to
love a 7th century preacher more than their own families, that's up to
them, but nobody else is obliged to take it seriously . . .
Except that if you don't take it seriously and accord it proper respect
you are physically threatened, on a scale that no other religion has
aspired to since the Middle Ages. One can't help wondering why such
violence is necessary, given that, as Mueller notes: 'If any of you
clowns are right about anything, the cartoonists are going to hell
anyway – won't that do? In the meantime, if you want to get excited
about affronts to Muslims, read the Amnesty International reports on
Syria and Saudi Arabia.' Many people have noted the contrast between the
hysterical 'hurt' professed by Muslims and the readiness with which Arab
media publish stereotypical anti-Jewish cartoons. At a demonstration in
Pakistan against the Danish cartoons, a woman in a black burka was
photographed carrying a banner reading 'God Bless Hitler'. In response
to all this frenzied pandemonium, decent liberal newspapers deplored the
violence and made token noises about free speech. But at the same time
they expressed 'respect' and 'sympathy' for the deep 'offence' and
'hurt' that Muslims had 'suffered'. The 'hurt' and 'suffering'
consisted, remember, not in any person enduring violence or real pain of
any kind: nothing more than a few daubs of printing ink in a newspaper
that nobody outside Denmark would ever have heard of but for a
deliberate campaign of incitement to mayhem. I am not in favour of
offending or hurting anyone just for the sake of it. But I am intrigued
and mystified by the disproportionate privileging of religion in our
otherwise secular societies. All politicians must get used to
disrespectful cartoons of their faces, and nobody riots in their
defence. What is so special about religion that we grant it such
uniquely privileged respect? As H. L. Mencken said: 'We must respect the
other fellow's religion, but only in the sense and to the extent that we
respect his theory that his wife is beautiful and his children smart.'
It is in the light of the unparalleled presumption of respect for
religion that I make my own disclaimer for this book. I shall not go out
of my way to offend, but nor shall I don kid gloves to handle religion
any more gently than I would handle anything else.
Copyright © 2006 by Richard Dawkins. Reprinted by permission of
Houghton Mifflin Company.
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(Continues...)
Excerpted from "The God Delusion"
by Richard Dawkins.
Copyright (C) 2008 by Richard Dawkins.
Excerpted by permission.
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